Rebuilding trust in global biosecurity

Sana Zakaria and Daniela Rodriguez Rincon of RAND Europe set out steps to improve biosecurity. They say strategic rivalry is a lasting feature of global politics, not a passing phase, and that countries must keep working together between crises.

Sana Zakaria
Sana Zakaria
Director, Emerging Technologies & Resilience, RAND Europe
Daniela Rodriguez Rincon
Daniela Rodriguez Rincon
Research Leader, Science and Emerging Technology, RAND Europe

8 Jun 2026

Nurse, working at the clinic

A novel pathogen can spread from one country to multiple continents within weeks. Yet the trust needed to share sequence data fast enough to mount a response is fracturing. Strategic rivalry now dictates who shares what, with whom, and on what terms.

The networks exist. The willingness to use them at speed does not.[1]

Security-driven suspicion shapes every decision about genomic data, outbreak intelligence and medical counter-measures. As the gap widens between scientific capability and political co-operation, the risk of delayed response to the next outbreak grows. But there are ways to build a sturdier biosecurity architecture that accepts each country's sovereignty yet still preserves our collective safety. Here is what that would take.

From scientific internationalism to guarded sovereignty

In the early 2000s, global health co-operation largely rested on a simple trade-off: pathogens were a shared threat, so data and samples had to be too. SARS, H5N1 and H1N1 all reinforced the same point: early and open data sharing saves lives.

That consensus fractured in 2007, when Indonesia withheld H5N1 samples.[2] Its argument: that rich countries and Western firms were benefiting from shared materials while poorer countries could not afford the vaccines that followed.

Since then, pathogens have been treated not as a global commons, but as national assets with economic and strategic value.

The geopolitics of biological research

Biological research has become more powerful but also more political. Synthetic biology, genome editing and AI have widened the scope for innovation, but also for misuse and security concerns.[3] The United States has tightened controls[4] on a range of dual-use tools and biotech links with China. Others are moving in the same direction.

That shift now shapes pathogen politics. Samples and sequence data are now seen as bargaining power. Covid-19 made that plain. The argument over the virus’s origins quickly became a geopolitical fight,[5] with politics clouding evidence and making co-operation harder just when it was most needed.

When co-operation breaks down, no one is safe

Once health security becomes a proxy for strategic competition, everyone becomes more exposed. In a world where the barriers to engineering pathogens are lowered, delayed sharing by one country can weaken protection for all. The weakest point in the system sets the real level of global safety.

The 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa[6] showed the cost of delay. Slow release of case and laboratory data contributed to a local emergency becoming a regional one. Institutions such as the Africa Centres for Disease Control can reduce that risk, but they cannot eliminate it. Infrastructure is not a substitute for trust. That lesson is being relearned now. In May 2026, the WHO declared a public health emergency over an outbreak of Bundibugyo ebolavirus in the DRC[7]—a strain for which no vaccines or therapeutics exist, and which went undetected for weeks because field tests were calibrated for a different species. The response is hampered by armed conflict, overwhelmed hospitals, and aid cuts[8] that had already hollowed out disease surveillance in eastern DRC before the virus was identified.

The same is true for DNA-synthesis screening.[9] Screening only works when most providers apply comparable rules and share information on suspicious orders. Yet in a low-trust environment, governments are reluctant to align rules or share data that might reveal capability or hurt domestic firms. The result is a patchwork that determined actors can exploit.

The Pandemic Agreement and PABS: promise and paralysis

The WHO Pandemic Agreement,[10] adopted in May 2025, was meant to show that multilateralism could still deliver. But its hardest question was deferred. Member states agreed the broad text, then pushed the operational details of the Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing system, or PABS, into a separate legally binding annexe.[11]

PABS is meant to be a transactional bargain. Countries share pathogen samples and genomic sequences rapidly. In return, manufacturers using that data must give 20% of their real-time production to WHO, half donated, half at affordable prices. Share data, receive vaccines. The logic is simple; implementation is not.

Lower- and middle-income countries want binding guarantees because they remember being pushed to the back of the queue for vaccines during covid-19. Richer countries are resisting rules they think could constrain industry or force technology transfer. As of late March 2026, core disputes still remain, including financing and how to trace digital-sequence information.[12]

PABS will test whether the international community can move beyond the moral appeals that failed in 2021. If it cannot, the Pandemic Agreement may remain unsigned.

The 100 Days Mission: speed without equity?

The 100 Days Mission[13] sets an important target: develop vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics within 100 days of identifying a new threat. That ambition has driven real progress in platforms, trials and manufacturing. But speed is not the same as access. Many countries still lack the regulatory strength, financing and production capacity to use those tools quickly or fairly.[14] Without firmer rules on sharing data and counter-measures allocation, a 100-day scientific success could still produce a deeply unequal response.

The task is to design co-operation that is resilient to rivalry rather than contingent on harmony.

Build co-operation that works even under geopolitical rivalry

A realistic biosecurity architecture must accept that strategic competition is a structural feature of international politics, not a temporary aberration. The task is to design co-operation that is resilient to rivalry rather than contingent on harmony. Five steps would help here:

  1. Hardwire timely data-sharing and sample access into systems countries already use. Emerging “always on” platforms such as international pathogen-surveillance networks and aviation-based wastewater pilots can feed into secure repositories with pre-agreed rules for when and how genomic data are released. The PABS system is meant to codify these triggers, tying rapid sharing of materials and sequence information to predictable access to vaccines, diagnostics and treatments. The exchange needs to be automatic, not discretionary.

  2. Link pathogen sharing to predictable benefits. Countries will not share data if they expect to be last in line for the resulting vaccines. The PABS-annexe negotiations must deliver enforceable allocation commitments. Without transactional clarity, the system will fail at the first real test.

  3. Build protected channels for quiet communication between rivals. A depoliticised network for outbreak intelligence and emergency consultation, building on WHO and regional platforms, could allow governments to clarify unusual signals or allegations before they become public rows. Trusted technical hotlines could avert the spiral from anomaly to accusation.

  4. Strengthen countries’ regulatory and manufacturing capacity. Investment in regional centres for disease control and genomic analysis, and in vaccine and diagnostics manufacturing across multiple regions, would let countries plug into global surveillance and counter-measure networks without feeling they have ceded control. Recent 100 Days Mission scorecards show that while platform technologies and trial readiness have improved, many countries still lack the regulatory and manufacturing capacity to deploy tools quickly and fairly.

  5. Keep co-operation alive between crises. Regular science and technology reviews under WHO and the Biological Weapons Convention could track dual-use tools such as AI-assisted sequence design and update norms as they evolve. A standing system that links data-sharing performance to access to pooled financing, procurement schemes or R&D partnerships would give governments an incentive to keep co-operating even when they do not like one another.

Tools without will—where do we go from here?

Six years on from the initial lockdowns that marked the covid-19 pandemic, the global capacity to sequence a novel pathogen or to design and deliver a vaccine has never been greater. Yet our ability to share information, co-ordinate responses and act collectively is on shaky ground. Political foundations are too fragile to rely on. The challenge for leaders is to build a stronger framework that balances openness with accountability and national interests with mutual dependence.

Views or opinions expressed are those of the author and any individuals cited, and do not necessarily reflect those of Economist Enterprise or any other member of The Economist Group.

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