Who counts as a friend? Companies now ask this as geopolitical risk reshapes trade. The answer is “friendshoring”: firms shift supply chains towards allies.[1] As companies increase visibility into their supply chains through new tools and technologies, firms are better able to shift supply chains towards friendly markets. But the problem is not the idea; it is judging which relationships will last in a volatile world. Governments are now pursuing a similar strategy. Look closely and a new trading order is taking shape.
The global economy will not split neatly into eastern, western and neutral blocs. That view overstates the risk. Our analysis shows that fragmenting trade and finance is costly,[2] but geopolitics will not reshape trade in a tidy way. The process will be uneven. An indication of this comes from the European Union’s proposed Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA). Companies seeking reliable partners should study its exemptions for local-content rules and related trade agreements. These reveal how policymakers think about friendshoring. As firms follow suit, policy and business may reinforce each other.
What is the IAA?
The IAA is a proposal by the European Union to boost strategic industries, increase competitiveness and cut emissions. It reflects a growing concern that trade and economic ties can be used as tools of pressure for geopolitical aims. The aim is to strengthen Europe’s industrial base and make the climate transition a source of growth.
Without action, the IAA states that the EU risks becoming dependent on other countries for key green and digital technologies.[3] The plan’s most ambitious target is to raise manufacturing to 20% of GDP by 2035.
The importance of “union origin”
The most significant part of the Industrial Accelerator Act concerns local-content rules (LCRs) and foreign investment. These measures are aimed largely at China, where subsidies are one of many concerns. The OECD has calculated, for example, that Chinese steel firms receive subsidies that amount to five times more subsidies per unit of revenue than firms in other partner economies, and ten times more than firms in OECD member countries.[4] Overall, the IAA is a mix of protectionism with selective openness towards preferred partners.
Chapter 3, which covers industrial supply chains, sets out a shift. It allows inputs from countries with free-trade agreements with the EU—or that are part of existing origin-cumulation frameworks—to count towards “union origin”. In effect, the EU broadens its definition of local production to those with which it has a stable trade relationship, thereby enhancing trust and co-operation.
Yet the proposal allows for flexibility, as a trusted alliance may not endure. It allows the EU to exclude countries from these preferences even if they have trade agreements with the bloc. Exclusion can occur if a partner fails to grant equal treatment to EU goods, or if the EU judges that dependence on that country threatens supply chains. Broad exceptions in existing agreements provide further scope.
In practice, these rules are flexible. They give the EU wide discretion to deny “union origin” status to goods from third countries.
This is friendshoring in policy form. The proposal favours “trusted partners”, allowing their goods to count as “union origin” and so avoid local-content rules. But it also keeps the option to exclude them. Countries that do not offer equal treatment, or that create unwanted dependencies, can still be shut out under broad exceptions.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) also comes with conditions. The proposal aims to ensure that investment brings skills, jobs and integration into European supply chains. The rules apply to emerging sectors—such as electric vehicles, solar, batteries and critical raw materials—for projects worth more than €100m from countries that account for more than 40% of global output in these sectors.
Investors must meet at least four of six requirements. These include limits on foreign ownership, joint ventures with EU firms, sharing intellectual property, spending on research and development in Europe, and plans to strengthen local supply chains.
But there is an important exception. These conditions do not apply to countries with free-trade or similar agreements with the EU, where rules on non-discrimination already exist.
Trade lawyers will be busy. Companies operating in Europe need to know where their home countries stand under the new rules. For supply chains and procurement, the IAA shows where trade policy is heading.
Certain details still need to be clarified and its compatibility with World Trade Organisation rules will be tested. But the direction is evident. The EU is tightening links with preferred partners while raising barriers for others.
That shift comes as the bloc pushes ahead with trade deals with Mercosur, India and Australia, and explores closer ties with Canada (in line with Mark Carney’s middle-power strategy[5]). As the IAA favours aligned economies, more mid-sized countries will seek agreements with the EU.
Firms that ignore these changes risk falling behind.
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