Trade’s dullest rulebook entry is becoming one of its sharpest weapons. As politics transcends trade, rules of origin (RoO) are becoming instruments of economic statecraft. Origin is now a matter not just of production but of power.
These rules decide which country’s tariff, quota or sanction applies to an imported good. They fall into two types: preferential and non-preferential. Both determine a product's economic nationality. Preferential RoO (those rules included in preferential trade agreements) decide whether a good qualifies for the lower tariff rates offered to partners. Non-preferential rules apply in other contexts, including anti-dumping, countervailing or other safeguard measures and trade statistics. But as the World Trade Organisation's most-favoured-nation principle (under which all members enjoy the same trading terms) splinters, non-preferential RoO will increasingly determine which tariff rates apply.
The usual criteria are that a good must be “wholly obtained” in one country, or “substantially transformed” there, to count as originating from that nation.
The Trump test
These ‘usual criteria’ are becoming less so. The shift is clearest in the United States.
President Donald Trump’s revived tariff regime has turned non-preferential origin from a bureaucratic footnote into a commercial hazard. His administration’s tariffs now vary by country. Firms that misdeclare origin risk penalty duties of up to 40% if goods are judged to have been “transshipped” through third countries to evade higher tariffs.
Washington is also toying with how it defines origin in its trade deals. The US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) renegotiations threaten a new principle: sovereign control rather than physical presence. Under this emerging American approach, origin depends on who owns and directs the producer. The aim is primarily to prevent Chinese companies establishing factories in Mexico to gain preferential market access to the US market.

The rationale? That Chinese company operations, like BYD, though nominally Mexican, are ultimately controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. The idea is to code in a China-out policy into USMCA.
Evidence of transshipment and incorporation of Chinese components into North American supply chains underscores why Washington is keen to tighten ownership-based origin rules under USMCA.
The approach is not novel. In 2022 the Biden administration’s steel-tariff deal with Britain required an annual assurance that any UK steelmaker owned or controlled by Chinese entities showed “no evidence of market-distorting practices.” Without assurance, those exports would lose their market access privileges.
Nor is the United States alone. The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement applies a similar test to fish caught outside territorial waters. For a catch to qualify as “originating,” it must come from a “vessel of a Party”— one registered and flagged in the UK or the EU and at least 50% owned by their nationals or companies.
These changes mark a profound shift: rules of origin are being weaponised as tools of industrial policy and national security, reshaping trade around control of companies. In short, ownership is defining origin.
From transformation to control
The WTO and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), both intergovernmental organisations, are exploring how to modernise RoO. Their proposals go beyond the traditional test of “substantial transformation,” focusing instead on value added and the nationality of the manufacturer. Under such a system, a product made in Viet Nam by a Chinese-owned firm could be treated as Chinese, even if most of its content were not.
America’s steel assurances show that ownership-based origin rules are already being applied. Beyond multilateral reform, future plurilateral trade pacts may require governments to audit foreign-controlled producers for subsidies or other non-market behaviour. The rationale is geopolitical: trade rules are becoming instruments for screening state influence.
If a rules-of-origin update were to reflect the nationality of ownership rather than the location of production, the global consequences would be profound. Countries that have invested heavily overseas would see the benefits diminish, as their firms’ goods could still be treated as originating at home and subject to the same tariffs or sanctions. That would weaken incentives for globalisation, deter host-country development and fragment supply chains along political lines. For China, the risk is acute: its vast overseas network of manufacturing and resource projects could lose preferential market access if goods made abroad by Chinese-owned firms are still branded Chinese.
The European Union now uses non-preferential RoO not only to apply anti-dumping and countervailing duties, but also to advance its agenda on sustainability, human rights and security. These rules can have positive effects by discouraging forced labour, curbing deforestation and cutting carbon emissions.

The rise of “deep origin”
This shift is captured in the idea of ”deep origin.” It refers to tracing a product’s provenance through every tier of its supply chain, sometimes verified by forensic tools such as isotopic analysis. The concept builds on non-preferential origin to identify where a product truly comes from. For the European Union, the goal is to align market access with its values to shape the quality of trade rather than just the volume.
Deep origin also serves geopolitical interests. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU and its allies banned imports from occupied territories such as Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk. De jure, grain or steel from these regions is Ukrainian; de facto, much of it is exported under Russian labels. Determining true origin is now central to enforcing sanctions and cutting off illicit revenue. As trade and security blur, the politicisation of rules of origin becomes inevitable.
Principles vs protectionism
For businesses, challenges abound. First, compliance is costly: tracing the origin of every input and certifying it against new standards. Second, the rules are fragmented. There is not a single global system; countries still apply their own. The result is an expanding patchwork of national laws that can overlap or conflict with one another. Trade may become slower and costlier in practice, and a tool of economic coercion in politics. As it turns into an arm of foreign policy, the line between principled and plain protectionism grows thin.

This tension will play out between the US, the EU and China. As the US raises barriers against Chinese goods, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Archimedes Index suggests the EU market is the prime candidate for surplus Chinese goods. By tightening definitions of origin, Europe can prevent Chinese firms from routing goods through Vietnam or Mexico to avoid scrutiny.
That could reshape global trade. Applied well, such rules can block unfair competition without resorting to blanket tariffs; misapplied, they risk deepening the fragmentation of the trading system.
Weaponising origin
Rules of origin now decide not only who trades, but whose values prevail in that trade. And the logic of origin is spreading. The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security has made known its Affiliates Rule, extending export-control restrictions to any foreign company 50% or more owned (directly or indirectly) by an entity already on Washington’s Entity List or Military End-User list. The measure automatically blacklists subsidiaries and joint ventures linked to sanctioned Chinese firms.
The policy shows how Washington is becoming increasingly inventive in limiting market access through ownership tests, as well as tariffs and quotas. It amounts to a new form of origin control.
As nations politicise supply chains, the simple question “Where was it made?” has acquired a new answer: “Everywhere—and that is why it matters.” Yet in a world where everything is made everywhere, using rules of origin as instruments of economic coercion risks crippling the globalised trade system they were meant to sustain.

