The rise of plurilateral trade deals

Plurilateral agreements are playing a bigger role in global trade. How do they work, and why do they matter? John Ferguson, initiative lead of The Future of Trade, interviews George Riddell, Managing Director, Goyder Ltd.

George Riddell
Managing Director, Goyder Ltd.

1 Oct 2026

The rise of plurilateral trade deals

At a time when multilateral trade policymaking is under strain, attention is turning to so-called plurilateral agreements. Rather than involving the entire membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), these are negotiated among a smaller group of countries. But they raise concerns of their own. Following the release of a policy paper by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), I spoke to one of its authors, leading trade expert George Riddell, about the role plurilateral agreements could play in the trading system.

1. How should we address the concerns that the increasing use of plurilaterals could lead to fragmentation, the erosion of consensus and the marginalisation of developing countries?

Business wants to see progress on trade matters which are impacting their operations every day. That was one of the key messages from the 2026 WTO Public Forum. At the moment, achieving agreement among all 166 WTO members has proven difficult; plurilaterals are the vehicle through which willing members can keep making meaningful trade rules, which is the case set out in the recent ICC policy paper, What next for plurilateral trade agreements? I take these concerns seriously. Each can and should be addressed through the way such agreements are designed and integrated into the WTO system.

On marginalisation, there are several structural steps which can be taken to make sure that these concerns are addressed: open accession, transparency, application of the most-favoured-nation (MFN) principle where appropriate, and genuine technical assistance are what make participation real for developing-country WTO members and the businesses they represent. I would stress that the assistance has to reach further back than implementation: developing countries need support to assess opportunities and prepare domestically before they can negotiate effectively, not just once they have joined an agreement.

On fragmentation, this is already happening—it is better to have agreements within the WTO than outside it as plurilaterals that extend their benefits on an MFN basis and remain open to new participants are built to multilateralise over time. That pathway should be reinforced through greater transparency and systematic information sharing across initiatives.

On consensus, it serves a legitimate accountability function where non-participants' rights are affected. But where an outcome does not alter those rights or obligations, judged against objective criteria rather than assertion, consensus should not be used as a blocking tool.

2. Can you explain what openness by design and the extension of benefits on an MFN basis mean?

Openness by design means building an initiative from the outset so that it strengthens the multilateral trading system rather than fragmenting it: publicly available texts, open accession, benefits extended on an MFN basis and a built-in review. This is the single most important safeguard against fragmentation. Extending benefits on an MFN basis means that the concessions, for instance zero tariffs on covered products, apply to all WTO members and not only to those who sign up.

Plurilaterals have existed since the GATT era. More recent examples include the Information Technology Agreement and its expansion, the Pharmaceutical Agreement and the Chemicals agreement, all of which extend their benefits on an MFN basis. Plurilaterals are a long-standing practice, not a new or novel approach in trade agreements. The issue that WTO members need to properly address is the free-rider problem: if WTO members are going to pursue market-access commitments then that will generally require a critical mass of either the WTO membership or percentage of global trade. Take the Agreement on Electronic Commerce: some 67 members, representing roughly 70% of global trade, adopted interim arrangements at the 14th Ministerial Conference on March 28th 2026 to bring it into force while continuing to seek its incorporation into the WTO legal architecture. It enters into force once 45 instruments of acceptance are deposited, with co-convenors targeting mid-2027. Singapore has moved to deposit first and the EU is expected to follow soon. Keeping successive phases of such an agreement legally distinct also helps: it eases domestic ratification and leaves the door open to members that join a later phase.

Meanwhile, newer plurilateral agreements like the E-Commerce Agreement or Investment Facilitation Agreement deal with the domestic regulation of different trade and investment barriers which affect businesses rather than purely market access.

3. The pharmaceutical sector is facing some trade-policy challenges right now. What principles should be considered for potential plurilaterals in this sector?

I would hold to four principles. First, participants should commit to refrain from putting tariffs on biopharmaceutical products and their inputs, whether as retaliation in a dispute or to correct a trade imbalance. Given the humanitarian stakes, insulating medicines from trade-remedy weaponisation should be a baseline norm. Second, trade facilitation tailored to the sector: expedited clearance for time-sensitive medicines, recognition with the World Customs Organisation on product classifications and technical assistance for customs agencies. Third, regulatory co-operation that goes beyond transparency, including regulatory reliance and mutual recognition, which would cut duplicative inspections and get products to patients faster. Fourth, intellectual-property disciplines ensuring technology transfer happens on a voluntary and mutually agreed basis, consistent with the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement. Alongside these, I would reactivate the review of the existing WTO Pharmaceutical Agreement, which has been dormant since 2010, expand its coverage to biologics, mRNA products and diagnostics, and widen participation to include the major generic producers.

4. What should a potential plurilateral consider for carbon border adjustment mechanism interoperability and other supply-chain regulations such as deforestation and forced labour?

With the EU’s CBAM operational and comparable measures under active consideration in the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia among others, I see a clear case for a plurilateral that establishes common methodologies for calculating embedded carbon, frameworks for mutual recognition of carbon-pricing schemes, a green lane for goods from participating jurisdictions and a transparency mechanism. In sessions with business over the past year, the central operational constraint was supplier data: actual embedded-emissions figures remained hard to obtain and default values were relied on as a fallback. The structural problems, however, sat elsewhere, in the absence of equivalence between emissions-trading systems and the divergence across the growing set of CBAM-type measures. Common methodology and mutual recognition need to address those directly. What interests me most is the wider potential: this architecture could become the foundation for co-operation on other sustainability supply-chain regulations, particularly deforestation and forced labour, where divergent national rules are generating much the same compliance burden. For business, that early convergence on carbon methodology would reduce duplicative reporting and lower the risk of stranded compliance investment as further measures arrive.

There is already a working precedent for the coalition approach: the Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability, signed in 2024 by Costa Rica, Iceland, New Zealand and Switzerland, eliminates tariffs on more than 300 environmental goods, takes commitments on over 100 environmental services, and is built as an open pathfinder.

5. Regarding the more ambitious areas for future negotiations, what areas should be considered related to critical minerals and supply-chain resilience?

This is one the more ambitious areas to tackle. Supply-chain resilience is probably an easier place to start as critical minerals sit at the crux of many of today’s most difficult geopolitical tensions. Indeed, outside the WTO there have been several initiatives actively looking at supply-chain resilience and how such matters could be dealt with in new ways. This is true of both the Future Investment and Trade Partnership whose 17 members in July agreed on a declaration looking at strengthening supply-chain resilience and security, or bilaterally such as the recent New Zealand-Singapore Agreement on Trade in Essential Supplies which prevents unnecessary export restrictions on critical goods during global crises or supply-chain disruptions. It will be great to see these ideas brought as part of any plurilateral discussions in Geneva in due course.

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