The electronics sector has, for many years, functioned via supply networks and innovation frameworks that are integrated on a global scale. These are now fragmenting. Samsung, a consumer and industrial electronics business, sought safe harbour from rising geopolitical tensions by shifting its smartphone factories from China to Vietnam. Yet, faced with significant tariffs from the US on Vietnamese goods, Samsung is now exploring further diversification of production to India, in an effort to capitalise on lower tariffs and local-production incentives. Across the electronics industry, firms are finding that building resilience is growing more complex and costly. Higher compliance burdens, duplication and supply-chain adjustments are primary factors.
Geopolitical pressures are also reshaping where companies conduct research, design products and share technology. Our survey of over 450 electronics executives reveals that export controls, sanctions, subsidies and regulatory divergences are changing how businesses distribute their innovation, pick their partners and protect their intellectual property (IP).
“Product and process design model” is now a hybrid architecture combining a common core with regional adaptations.
Design by decree
For decades the electronics sector researched globally, sourced efficiently and sold unified products to international customers. That model no longer holds. Amid unpredictable geopolitics, governments increasingly want control over critical technologies rather than encouraging their global diffusion. Nearly three-quarters of executives (71%) say that their preferred “product and process design model” is now a hybrid architecture combining a common core with regional adaptations. A further 19% are creating entirely bespoke regional variants tailored to specific regulatory or customer requirements. This improves national resilience to geo-economic conflict.
Nearly three-quarters of executives say their preferred design model is now a common core with regional adaptations.
Research and development (R&D) footprints are most in flux in Asia and North America: over half of North American respondents have reduced R&D in Asia, and 59% of Asian respondents have trimmed activities in North America. This change is largely state-driven. Sixty percent of executives cite IP portability and data-sovereignty concerns, and 53% say that export-control and dual-use compliance requirements are more influential to product design than they were five years ago. The sharpest changes are taking place in Asia. US semiconductor export controls on China, together with the addition of several of Chinese firms to trade blacklists, are limiting Chinese electronics in Western markets. At the same time, the EU plans to phase Chinese firms such as Huawei and ZTE out of telecommunications networks. These pressures reinforce China’s push for technological self-reliance. Elsewhere in Asia, firms are boosting domestic investment while rebalancing rather than expanding,their global footprint.

These shifts matter because today’s most important innovations depend on complex hardware and tightly controlled manufacturing. Firms are pulling core capabilities back in-house or to trusted hubs: 65% have relocated design enablement and simulation and 65% have consolidated data infrastructure. Innovation is becoming more controlled. Governments are reinforcing this shift by backing domestic capacity, like Malaysia’s Semiconductor IC Design Park. Firms are adjusting in turn. Intel’s expansion of advanced packaging in Malaysia shows how companies now tailor technologies to specific markets rather than deploy them globally.
Innovation is becoming more controlled as firms pull core capabilities back in-house or into trusted hubs.
Innovation behind borders
Our survey finds these shifts are already carrying operational costs. Executives most often cite higher production and compliance costs (59%), alongside reduced cross-border collaboration or technology transfer (42%), and slower access to specialised tools, materials and talent (38%). For an industry built on global knowledge networks and tightly specialised supply chains, these are not marginal frictions: they raise co-ordination costs, slow product development and make it harder to combine capabilities across borders. As governments tighten export controls, impose tariffs and subsidise domestic champions, firms struggle to move technology, talent and components across jurisdictions.
Amid this trade uncertainty, countries are strengthening domestic electronics capabilities and shifting overseas operations to friendly markets. This is regionalising R&D. Seventy-one percent of Asian firms, 63% of European firms and 60% of North American firms increased R&D on their home continent and, although Middle Eastern respondents were the least likely to shift their R&D footprint, those who did so increased it at home.
This regionalisation is being reinforced by industrial policy. Firms now weigh incentives, sanctions and political positioning far more heavily when deciding where to locate operations. Governments are using these levers to pull R&D inwards and favour domestic capacity, reflecting a broader shift towards technological self-reliance.
Over the past decade “Made in China 2025” has sought to reduce dependence on foreign technology and strengthen domestic manufacturing through subsidies, tax incentives and other industrial tools, the same levers survey respondents now identify as most influential in deciding where to set up operations. When the US started limiting China’s access to foreign technology and markets, China was already prepared to shift towards domestic production and innovation. More broadly, trade restrictions are reinforcing the push for technological self-reliance as cross-border innovation slows. Forty-two percent of respondents say that reduced cross-border collaboration or technology transfer affects operations and R&D ecosystems.
Across jurisdictions, the goal is to reduce external dependence. Incentives for firms are overwhelmingly domestic: subsidies and preferential procurement encourage companies to locate their activities at home, and export controls and tariffs discourage technology transfer abroad. As a result, companies are rethinking their global footprints, expanding capacity where political support and regulatory certainty are strongest.

Trusted circuits
As cross-border collaboration becomes harder, firms are becoming more selective about partners. Over two-thirds (68%) of executives report enhancing due diligence procedures when choosing partners and 62% note a definitive shift towards regional alliances or “allynovation”. These alliances are often unstable as political priorities shift. This undermines the durable partnership networks that prevailed between once like-minded nations.
Companies are expanding capacity where political support and regulatory certainty are strongest.
Against this backdrop, firms struggle to define trusted partners, protect IP and ensure reciprocity, especially as governments impose unilateral restrictions. IP protection strategies have become far more defensive. The top three methods for protecting IP are applying black-box or restricted-access models for external partners (52%, up from 14% five years ago), restricting technology transfer or training in high-risk jurisdictions (44%, up from 10%, the least-used method five years ago), and keeping sensitive R&D and design work in trusted jurisdictions (39%, up from 11%). Five years ago, none of these approaches were in the top three, suggesting growing distrust and a drive towards keeping technologies in-house.
The notion of cybersecurity risk has also moved to the forefront of industry strategy as firms increasingly limit cross-border technology transfer. Notably, North Americans were most likely to say that they are protecting IP by restricting activities in high-risk jurisdictions (55%, compared with an average of 44%), reflecting the influence of the US government’s strategic posture. This reflects a shift in how electronics firms govern R&D and manage knowledge flows.

The electronics industry was built on global knowledge networks and tightly specialised supply chains. Geopolitics is making both harder to sustain.
The top methods for protecting intellectual property all involve restricting access, limiting transfer or keeping research inside trusted jurisdictions.
Building geopolitical muscle
To sustain innovation in a fragmented system, governments must move beyond reactive industrial policy and create conditions in which firms can continue to innovate while managing geopolitical risk. These may include:
Aligning incentives with innovation scale: Fragmentation is reducing returns to R&D. Governments can offset this by expanding targeted incentives for high-value research and advanced manufacturing. Recent European proposals, including the Industrial Accelerator Act, reflect this shift towards using industrial policy to bolster technological sovereignty while sustaining innovation.
Accelerating and strengthening IP systems: Stricter data and IP localisation raise risks and compliance costs. Faster patent approvals, lower administrative burdens and stronger protections will be critical, especially where complex systems already slow innovation.
Balancing localisation with openness: Data and IP localisation are central to industrial policy but risk fragmenting innovation and raising costs. Governments should avoid unnecessary barriers to cross-border collaboration and technology diffusion.
Strengthening trusted research ecosystems: As collaboration narrows, governments must support partnerships between industry, universities and research institutions. Aligning standards across trusted partners and ensuring viable collaboration models will sustain cross-border innovation.

Firms must adapt in parallel. Policy can shape the environment, but companies must redesign how they innovate and operate in it, which could include:
Adopting modular architectures: Firms must design products so regulated components can be easily swapped or decoupled to comply with regional export controls. This preserves economies of scale in core technologies while accommodating divergent regulatory regimes.
Mastering secure “black-box” collaboration: As open knowledge-sharing declines, firms must collaborate without exposing critical IP. Secure digital infrastructure, stronger cybersecurity safeguards and compartmentalised processes allow regional partners to test and integrate products without accessing underlying source code or designs.
Building internal geopolitical capability: Geopolitics can no longer be managed ad hoc. Firms should establish dedicated cross-functional teams involved in R&D, supply-chain and capital-allocation decisions, ensuring technical roadmaps align with compliance and market strategy.
Strengthening regional innovation ecosystems: As cross-border collaboration becomes harder, firms should deepen partnerships with local suppliers, research institutions and government programmes to sustain innovation while aligning with industrial policy. Even within integrated markets, political incentives often fragment activity as governments favour domestic industries over wider efficiency, slowing integration. This is seen in Europe’s single-market national barriers and stalled capital markets and energy links.
As firms adapt their innovation models, they must now weigh resilience against returns. The next article examines how executives are redesigning operating models and capital allocation to capture value in a more fragmented world.
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