Britain can make more of its existing capability and closest connections
A lot of debate about strengthening Britain's national resilience, supply chains and economic security focuses on building new capability. We must not, however, overlook or undervalue what we already have.

29 Jul 2026

More than seven in ten British companies already supplying a critical sector recently told us they could supply at least one more—with defence the most-cited sector. This finding from the Critical Supply Group's UK Supply Report 2026, based on 194 responses from companies supplying the United Kingdom's 13 critical national infrastructure sectors, points to an opportunity sitting alongside investment in new capability. Significant capability already exists across the UK economy, and it should be better recognised, engaged and utilised.
The more interesting question is why. Only 8% of companies told us they blame a lack of internal capacity. Instead, 67% cited procurement and tendering complexity, 64% pointed to limited visibility of forward opportunities, and 91% reported at least one structural barrier to market access. For companies already supplying critical sectors, capacity is therefore rarely the reason that they can't do more. Connection is: clearer short- and long-term pipelines, simpler pre-qualification and earlier engagement between buyers and suppliers are all considerably less expensive than building new capacity from scratch.
The connection issue is not confined to a single sector. Most companies in the survey already supply more than one critical sector, and the additional capability they report is spread widely—defence, civil nuclear, space, energy, government, emergency services. Yet the UK's critical sectors are still largely regulated and procured vertically. A firm with proven capability in one often finds no clear route into another where that same capability would count. This is part of the gap the Critical Supply Group exists to close by connecting capability across sectors so that expertise built for one critical sector can be extended to others.
The report's leading recommendation calls for clearer ministerial ownership of UK supply chain resilience, bringing together industrial strategy, public procurement and national resilience. Japan created the world's first dedicated economic security minister in 2021, with explicit responsibility for supply chains. Britain has no equivalent. Industry has its own gaps too: only a third of companies told us they have formally documented the critical inputs they depend on, and over a third have no clear source of resilience information (this is concentrated heavily among SMEs). As Professor Aristides Matopoulos, MAP Adviser and developer of the Supply Chain Readiness Levels framework, observes: "Britain needs full visibility and tools in place to monitor the state of supply chain readiness and resilience across its critical national infrastructure on a continuous basis. This report provides an important evidence base on which to build."
What already exists could also be valued more strategically. A UK supplier who costs slightly more but can be second-sourced quickly, or holds spare capacity for a crisis, offers value a lowest-price tender cannot account for. The COVID-19 pandemic made the cost of ignoring that value clear. Britain already has the legal architecture for this: the Social Value Act has required public bodies to weigh broader value since 2012, and the Procurement Act 2023 was intended, in part, to make resilience and capability easier to reward. The law already exists. Applying it more deeply and consistently would enable a bigger impact.
This rests on evidence, not assumption. As Professor Edward Sweeney, MAP adviser and a contributor to the World Economic Forum, puts it: "The increasingly challenging critical supply chain environment requires an evidence-based approach to decision-making. The recommendations in this report are based on a robust piece of research and provide a strong basis for effective action by key stakeholders." That evidence base is central to the Critical Supply Group's purpose as a channel between government and industry, as well as between sectors that too rarely interact.
The same logic extends beyond Britain's borders. This is not about self-sufficiency. Britain is, and will remain, a trading nation, and resilience depends as much on trusted partners abroad as on capability at home. That trust is a form of connection too, built and sustained over time rather than assumed. Companies in the survey rate Europe as by far the UK's most-trusted supply partner, well ahead of the United States, and further still of China. The WTO and IMF have both highlighted a reordering of global trade along geopolitical lines, not a temporary disruption. One of the report's recommendations responds to that shift: build on deep, trusted trading relationships through trade strategy delivery, strategic procurement and structured industry dialogue, while maintaining the UK's leadership on open, rules-based trade.
Capability and connection, in other words, are two sides of the same opportunity, and neither stops at Britain's shores. The countries that navigate a fragmenting trading system best will not be those that over-stretch trying to build as much as possible themselves, but the countries that understand the critical capability they already have, where additional investment should be prioritised, and which partners they can trust the most. This is a solid foundation for whatever comes next.
Making better use of what Britain already has is one of the most immediate opportunities to strengthen the resilience of critical supply chains. It deserves to sit more prominently alongside investment in the new capability the country needs.
Views or opinions expressed are those of the author and any individuals cited, and do not necessarily reflect those of Economist Enterprise or any other member of The Economist Group.