The conflict in the Persian Gulf has triggered one of the fastest disruptions to global commodity flows in recent years. Within days, tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz collapsed by more than 90%. That matters for food security because the strait normally carries around 20m barrels of oil per day, roughly one-fifth of the world’s liquefied natural gas, and up to 30% of internationally traded fertilisers. It is also a major source of sulphur, a key input for phosphate fertilisers.
The critical variable now is the duration of the conflict. A disruption measured in weeks can be absorbed by markets, but one that persists will move from markets to production. Once that happens, the outcome becomes far harder to reverse. The situation could deteriorate even further if Russia’s Baltic ports (Primorsk and Ust-Luga) are also affected, potentially halting an additional 40% of the country’s oil-export capacity and further exacerbating disruptions to oil prices.
We can already see the pressure building in input markets. Insurance premiums in the Gulf have surged, with coverage resetting every seven days. Fertiliser prices have followed. Middle East granular urea rose by nearly 20% in the first week of March to around $590 per tonne, while Egyptian urea increased by 28%. Because natural gas is a core feedstock for nitrogen fertilisers, prices could rise by a further 15-20% in the first half of 2026 if the disruption continues.
For farmers, the pass-through is straightforward. Fertiliser costs more; fuel costs more; irrigation and transport cost more. Faced with that combination, farmers do what they always do: they cut back or switch to crops that require less fertiliser or fix nitrogen more efficiently, such as moving from maize to soyabeans.
Timing is what makes this problem difficult. In Sri Lanka, the Maha rice harvest is taking place now. In Bangladesh, the Boro rice season is under way, and fertiliser is needed at this stage. These are narrow windows. You cannot simply wait and apply inputs later without affecting yields.
What happens next depends on how long the conflict continues. If the disruption is contained within a few weeks, markets can absorb the shock over the following months. Even so, the most exposed economies are coming under pressure. If it extends beyond that point, the effects move into production. Lower fertiliser use and shifts in crop choice begin to reduce yields in the next harvest, first in import-dependent countries. If it continues for around three months, the impact spreads to major exporters, turning a localised disruption into a global constraint on food production.
There is also a second pressure building. As oil prices rise above $100 per barrel, demand from the biofuel sector increases. That creates an additional market for crops such as maize and vegetable oils. It helps farmers facing higher costs, but it also pushes food prices higher.
Other risks could intensify the shock. Weather remains a constant source of volatility in agriculture. A poor El Niño year would reduce yields at the same time that input costs are rising and supply is constrained. In that situation, the pressures reinforce one another.
It is important to remember that the Gulf economies are major food importers, relying on imports for between 70% and 90% of their food supply. The conflict is disrupting trade and slowing economic activity. These same economies host millions of migrant workers from South Asia and East Africa. If economic activity weakens, remittance flows to those regions may fall, reducing household incomes in countries where remittances account for a significant share of GDP.
Policy responses need to follow the same timeline as the shock. In the short term, the priority is to develop alternative trade routes, provide emergency balance-of-payments support to vulnerable import-dependent countries, and finance farmers so liquidity constraints do not affect planting decisions. These measures need to be targeted to avoid distortions.
In the medium term, countries need to diversify import sources beyond the Gulf, strengthen regional reserve sharing and avoid export restrictions.
Over the longer term, resilience will depend on more efficient use of inputs, sustainable fertiliser production including green-ammonia initiatives, investment in renewable energy and stronger systems to withstand future shocks. Food systems will also need to be treated with the same strategic importance as energy and transport.
The conflict in the Persian Gulf will be debated in terms of energy prices and regional security. However, its consequences extend far beyond both. How long it continues will determine how much food the world produces—and how many people will have enough to eat.
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